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The distinction in Relevance Theory between two kinds of encoded meaning, 6 
conceptual and procedural, has evolved so that more and more components of 7 
encoded meaning, both linguistic and non-linguistic, are now taken to be 8 
procedural (non-conceptual). I trace these developments and assess the extent 9 
to which these diverse elements share properties that distinguish them from 10 
concept-expressing words. While the notion of procedural encoding has lost 11 
some of its original distinctiveness, it may make sense to think of all encoded 12 
meaning as procedural (including the meaning of concept-expressing words), 13 
but this necessitates the drawing of new clarifying distinctions among kinds of 14 
procedural meaning.   15 
 16 
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discourse connectives, expressives 18 
 19 
 20 
1.   Introduction 21 
 22 
Within Relevance Theory, an important distinction between two kinds of encoded (or 23 
conventional) word meaning was initiated by Diane Blakemore in the 1980s: the 24 
distinction between words that encode concepts and words that encode procedures. 25 
At the time, it looked as if the distinction she had in mind would line up pretty much 26 
with the elements of linguistic meaning that contribute to truth-conditional content 27 
(the conceptual) and those that do not (the procedural). So it could be seen as a 28 
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recasting of the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional semantic distinction in 29 
cognitive terms, drawing on the basic distinction in cognitive science between 30 
representations (descriptions of the world which are true or false) and computations 31 
over representations (including inferential processes that relate representations to 32 
one another in different ways, e.g. as premise and conclusion, as contradictory, as 33 
collective evidence for another representation): 34 
 35 
On the one hand, there is the essentially conceptual theory that deals with the 36 
way in which elements of linguistic structure map onto concepts – that is, onto 37 
constituents of propositional representations that undergo computations. On the 38 
other, there is the essentially procedural theory that deals with the way in which 39 
elements of linguistic structure map directly onto computations themselves – 40 
that is, onto mental processes.  41 
         (Blakemore 1987: 144)   42 
   43 
 This broad alignment of conceptual encoding with mental representations in 44 
the language of thought and of procedural encoding with mental processes has been 45 
largely maintained in subsequent work on the distinction. However, the notion of 46 
procedural meaning has been considerably extended since Blakemore’s early work 47 
so as to encompass encoded constraints on a range of pragmatic processes; for 48 
instance, it has been suggested that pronouns encode procedural meaning which 49 
constrains the process of reference assignment, and that morphemes indicating 50 
grammatical moods such as the indicative, the imperative, and the subjunctive, and 51 
modal particles (e.g. in Japanese), encode procedural meaning that constrains the 52 
pragmatic process of identifying the speaker’s attitude or degree of commitment to 53 
the proposition she has expressed (Wilson & Sperber 1993; Wilson 2011). On this 54 
basis, it might look as if the conceptual-procedural distinction more or less meshes 55 
with the traditional distinction between the substantive lexicon (open class words 56 
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such as nouns, verbs and adjectives) and the functional lexicon (closed class words 57 
like determiners, pronouns and connectives).  58 
 However, the notion of procedural (nonconceptual) meaning has also been 59 
applied to an array of what might be called ‘expressive’ communicative devices, 60 
including interjections, expletives, manual and facial gestures of certain sorts, and 61 
emotional prosody (Wharton 2009, Wilson & Wharton 2006). This is a curious 62 
situation as we now have under the banner of ‘procedural meaning’ some of the 63 
deepest components of I-language, such as pronouns and indicators of tense, 64 
aspect, and mood, together with communicative devices such as ‘oops!’, ‘dammit!’, 65 
winking, shrugging, and emotion-indicating tones of voice, which would seem to fall 66 
well outside I-language. This is not to say that the claim is wrong but it does call for 67 
some closer investigation. 68 
 The paper consists of two main parts, structured by the distinction between 69 
conceptual encoding and procedural encoding. In section 2, I focus on the idea that 70 
many words (nouns, verbs, adjectives) encode a concept, raising some problems for 71 
this view and presenting some other ways of construing their linguistic meaning and 72 
its relation to the concept communicated on an occasion of use. This section is 73 
relatively short, as I have discussed my thoughts on this at length elsewhere 74 
(Carston 2012, 2013, forthcoming). In the longer section 3, I turn to the more 75 
innovative aspect of the relevance-theoretic view of lexical semantics, according to 76 
which certain closed-class words and other units of (ostensive) communication 77 
encode ‘procedural meaning’. As noted, the idea of procedural encoding now 78 
encompasses a vast range of items, linguistic and nonlinguistic. I try to assess 79 
whether they constitute a single category of meaning in any positive sense, other 80 
than just all being ‘non-conceptual’. Finally, in section 4, I consider whether there 81 
might be a case for treating all encoded meaning as procedural in a broad sense 82 
(much broader than Blakemore’s initial idea) and then making a range of important 83 





2.   Conceptual meaning and concepts/senses expressed 87 
  88 
This section provides an overview of current ideas about the meaning of substantive 89 
(open class) words, which are standardly taken to encode or at least express 90 
concepts. It is not intended to be comprehensive or to provide detailed argument, but 91 
to set out those features of the story that may need to be called on when discussing 92 
the main topic, procedural meaning, in the next section. A terminological clarification: 93 
I use ‘meaning’ for the encoded or standing meaning of a word and ‘sense’ or 94 
‘concept’ for those contents that can be expressed or communicated by the use of 95 
the word. In principle, at least, it could be that the sense/concept communicated on 96 
some occasion is in fact the (standing) meaning of the word.   97 
 98 
2.1   The standard relevance-theoretic (RT) account   99 
 100 
According to the RT view of linguistic communication, many substantive words 101 
(nouns, verbs, adjectives) encode an unstructured (atomic) concept,1 which has an 102 
externalist semantics (what it denotes in the world) and various kinds of internalist 103 
informational connections, of which the key one here is its associated ‘encyclopaedic 104 
entry’, a repository of general knowledge (in the form of conceptual representations) 105 
about the object/property/activity in the world it denotes. To take a simple example, 106 
the word ‘child’ encodes an atomic concept CHILD which denotes or refers to a certain 107 
category of human beings. It also comes with a stash of general knowledge/beliefs 108 
about that category of individuals, perhaps including that they are young, need to be 109 
nurtured and looked after by adults, cannot take full responsibility for their own 110 
                                                          
1  Sperber & Wilson (1998) suggest that there are also numerous content words that do not encode a 
full-fledged concept but what might be called a ‘pro-concept’, e.g. ‘my’, ‘have’, ‘near’, ‘long’ (ibid: 185).  
5 
 
decisions and behaviour, are still developing physically and psychologically, and so 111 
on.  112 
 Understanding the sense or concept intended by the use of a word on a 113 
particular occasion of utterance typically requires some degree of modulation or 114 
adjustment of its encoded meaning. As discussed in relevance-theoretic work on 115 
‘lexical pragmatics’, this involves an interaction among the lexically encoded concept, 116 
other concepts encoded by the utterance and contextual information, constrained by 117 
the hearer’s expectation of relevance (Wilson & Carston 2007). The outcome of this 118 
process is what is known as an ad hoc concept (‘ad hoc’ in that it has to be 119 
inferentially derived on the particular occasion of use), which is marked with an 120 
asterisk (HAPPY*, CHILD*, OPEN*, etc.) to distinguish it from the context-independent 121 
lexical concept (HAPPY, CHILD, OPEN, etc.). The pragmatically derived concept may be 122 
more specific or more general than the encoded concept; that is, its denotation may 123 
be either a proper subset or a superset of the denotation of the linguistically encoded 124 
concept, or it may be a combination, both extending the lexical denotation and 125 
excluding some part of it. Consider the concepts that might be communicated by the 126 
following uses of the word ‘child’/‘children’: 127 
 128 
1.   a.    A father is shouting at his 10-year-old son who has been misbehaving.  129 
             Mother:  ‘You’re too hard on him. He’s still a child.’ 130 
      b.    Woman (speaking of her middle-aged husband):  ‘Boris is a child.’ 131 
      c.   ‘Our priority is to move the women and children to safety.’ 132 
      d.   ‘My children don’t visit much anymore – they are terribly busy and live on the  133 
            other  side of London.’ 134 
   135 
The use of ‘child’ in (1a) seems to be literal, but it is very likely a narrowing of the 136 
encoded concept CHILD to something paraphraseable as young person who cannot 137 
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be held fully responsible for his behaviour and has yet to acquire some social skills 138 
(implicating that the boy should not be too strongly reprimanded); this occasion-139 
specific sense may exclude some individuals who fall in the denotation of the 140 
encoded concept CHILD, those who always behave well and have precocious social 141 
know-how. In (1b), on the other hand, we clearly have a broadening of the encoded 142 
concept so that it can include in its denotation a 45-year old man, who has certain 143 
qualities that a child typically has.  144 
 When a lexical concept is decoded, the encyclopaedic information associated 145 
with it is activated. Some elements of it are more highly activated than others (as 146 
there are multiple sources of spreading activation, including other concepts encoded 147 
in the utterance and conceptual representations derived from the wider discourse 148 
situation). The most highly activated items of conceptually represented information 149 
are accessed and deployed as contextual assumptions in deriving contextual 150 
implications, which form an initial interpretive hypothesis about the utterance. Then, 151 
via a mechanism of mutual parallel adjustment of explicit utterance content, 152 
contextual assumptions and contextual implications, concepts in the decoded 153 
meaning string (the logical form of the utterance) are adjusted by backwards 154 
inference, so that only implications that are ultimately grounded in the explicature are 155 
confirmed. The overall interpretation is accepted provided it meets the addressee’s 156 
expectation of relevance. So, in the case of (1b) ‘Boris is a child’, depending on the 157 
wider discourse situation, contextual implications such as Boris doesn’t earn his 158 
keep, expects others to look after him, is irresponsible, etc. may be inferred, based 159 
on assumptions accessed from the encyclopaedic entry for CHILD, which, by 160 
backwards inference, lead to a particular ad hoc concept CHILD*. In another utterance 161 
situation, different items of encyclopaedic information about children might be more 162 
highly activated, making most accessible such implications as that Boris is sweet and 163 
innocent, untouched by life experience, naïve, etc. resulting in a distinct ad hoc 164 
concept CHILD** in the explicature. And there are many other possibilities. 165 
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 The two uses of ‘children’ in (1c) and (1d) are interesting in that, although they 166 
are clearly related, the sense of the first entails ‘not adult’, while the second does not, 167 
entailing rather a certain relationship with the speaker, that of being her offspring. 168 
These are both pretty conventional senses of ‘child/children’, which is thereby a case 169 
of a polysemous word, a lexical vehicle for a family of related senses (Carston 2013, 170 
forthcoming). I take it that all substantive words are polysemous or potentially so, and 171 
that polysemy is fundamentally a matter of pragmatics (see Falkum 2015) with a 172 
subsequent process of conventionalisation (of course, the vast majority of 173 
pragmatically derived senses/concepts are ephemeral and so don’t become 174 
established senses of a word).  The polysemy of substantive words plays a central 175 
role in the discussion to follow on different construals of a substantive word’s 176 
standing meaning and will also be considered in section 3 as a property that may 177 
distinguish conceptual meaning from procedural meaning.  178 
 Note that in the RT lexical pragmatic account of word meaning modulation just 179 
sketched, all the heavy lifting is done by the encyclopaedic entry of the encoded 180 
concept. This is the RT equivalent of what Fodor (2008: 94) talks of as the 181 
informational memos stored inside the file whose name or label is the lexical concept 182 
(e.g. CHILD, BLUE, TEACH). The role of the atomic concept itself (the address or file 183 
name) in this pragmatic process is just to provide a gateway or link, a means of 184 
access to the information that is used in constructing the ad hoc concept.   185 
 186 
2.2   Semantic underspecification views of word meaning 187 
 188 
According to the RT account given above, the encoded or standing meaning of the 189 
words discussed is a full-fledged concept, that is, a semantic entity, which can 190 
contribute directly to truth-conditional content.  As Fodor (1998: 24) puts it, 191 
applications of lexical concepts are susceptible of ‘semantic evaluation’, that is, the 192 
concept CAT is correctly applied to Felix the cat but incorrectly applied to Dumbo the 193 
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elephant; equivalently, ‘Felix is a cat’ is true while ‘Dumbo is a cat’ is false. Intuitive 194 
though this may be, it is worth pausing here and considering whether the lexical 195 
concept CHILD is correctly or incorrectly applied in the examples in (1) above, and 196 
from there, what exactly that concept is. In previous work, I have argued against the 197 
view that there is one particular concept that constitutes the encoded or standing 198 
meaning of a word (Carston 2013).  199 
 According to a range of other views, a word’s meaning is semantically 200 
underspecified: it does not specify a concept/sense which can contribute directly to 201 
truth conditions, but is either too rich or too meagre and has to be transformed in 202 
some way before it can contribute a specific semantic content. Recanati (2004) calls 203 
these ‘wrong format’ positions, that is, they are positions on which word meaning per 204 
se is the wrong kind of thing to figure as a component of content. Consideration of 205 
the phenomenon of polysemy plays a major role in motivating these accounts, both 206 
at the level of theoretical argument (e.g. Bosch 2007, Carston 2013) and of empirical 207 
results from testing the processing of polysemous words (e.g. Frisson 2009). I will not 208 
reiterate the details of either of these lines of argument and evidence here. Suffice it 209 
to say that the ‘Underspecification hypothesis’ concerning standing word meaning is 210 
currently in quite a strong position and meshes well with the kind of pragmatic 211 
account of communicated senses/concepts advocated by relevance theory, 212 
according to which: ‘…all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts: that is, 213 
whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a 214 
given utterance has to be contextually worked out’ (Sperber & Wilson 1998: 185). In 215 
other words, the (alleged) lexical concept is never simply decoded and taken to be 216 
the concept communicated. 217 
 There are, however, some difficult issues to be resolved before we could take 218 
on either of the two different manifestations of the underspecification view. I look at 219 
these in some detail in Carston (forthcoming), so will simply summarise briefly some 220 
problems with each view. According to the overly rich (semantic underspecification) 221 
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position, a standing word meaning consists of information from which a selection has 222 
to be made in grasping the concept/sense a speaker intends to convey by her use of 223 
a word on any given occasion. Pustejovsky’s (1995) ‘generative lexicon’ is a well-224 
known case in point and, more recently, Vicente (2015) has advocated another such 225 
rich view. He suggests that the standing meaning of words used to denote kinds (e.g. 226 
‘horse’, ‘leaf’, ‘gold’) should include information about the essence (the intrinsic 227 
properties) of the kind and about its superficial perceptible properties (which can be 228 
altered). In that way, the now famous case of variable truth conditions for utterances 229 
of the sentence ‘The leaves are green’ can be explained as involving different 230 
selections from this information-rich standing meaning of the word ‘leaf’ making for a 231 
different concept/sense expressed on different occasions of use. 232 
 The obvious question here concerns the grounds for singling out certain 233 
elements of our general knowledge about objects in the world and claiming that they 234 
constitute lexical meaning. This question arises equally for the general knowledge 235 
included in Pustejovsky’s (1995) ‘qualia structures’, e.g. for the noun ‘book’: books 236 
come into being via a writing process; the purpose of a book is to be read. On both 237 
accounts, there is a degree of arbitrariness in the real world knowledge invoked. 238 
Certainly, that knowledge does play a role in accounting for the derivation of some 239 
common (‘default’) senses associated with the words, but that is equally well 240 
accounted for by the relevance-theoretic pragmatic account on which the key 241 
information is not duplicated in the lexicon but maintained as components of the 242 
encyclopaedic entry. The pragmatic account is needed anyway for explaining other 243 
(non-default) senses/concepts communicated by a word and so provides a unitary 244 
account of all cases, while maintaining a clear principled distinction between standing 245 
word meaning (an atomic concept) and knowledge about the entities denoted by that 246 
encoded concept.  247 
 On the other underspecification view the standing word meaning is too 248 
meagre to play the role of a concept (a semantic content), so in any instance of 249 
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grasping the sense/concept communicated by a speaker on an occasion of 250 
utterance, the addressee must flesh out or enrich the decoded lexical meaning. 251 
Prima facie, this seems an attractive position, answering to a strong intuition that the 252 
various senses associated with a word must share a common core and any new 253 
uses must be constrained by this. However, reflection on the pragmatics of ad hoc 254 
concept construction indicates that this is not the case. Cases of narrowing or 255 
meaning precisification, such as the much discussed uses of verbs like ‘open’, ‘cut’ 256 
and ‘bear’ (Ruhl 1989, Carston 2012, Pritchard forthcoming) might seem to support a 257 
schematic meaning view, but there are just as many cases of broadening, 258 
narrowing/broadening combinations and metonymic use which typically require the 259 
dropping of some component of the alleged skeletal constraining meaning. As Bosch 260 
(2007: 7) puts it: ‘there are arbitrarily many parameters with respect to which 261 
contextual concepts [i.e. occasion-specific senses] can differ from one another.’ So 262 
any attempt to maintain a thin core lexical meaning requires that it be further 263 
attenuated in the face of these acceptable new uses, some of which will become 264 
conventionalised, thus adding to the polysemy of the word. In other words, the 265 
alleged schematic meaning does not restrict the senses/concepts that can be 266 
communicated, but must itself be adjusted in order to accommodate those uses if it is 267 
to represent the common core meaning.   268 
 Furthermore, it is striking in the work of advocates of this view that attempts to 269 
articulate any one of these schematic meanings are either inadequate or completely 270 
absent. Ruhl (1989) justifies this on the grounds that the schematic meaning is 271 
something unconscious and subpersonal: ‘… concrete meanings [senses] become 272 
pragmatic specifications of the abstract meaning, which is the meaning of the word. 273 
Such a meaning may seem nearly empty … General abstract meanings elude 274 
consciousness’ (ibid: 51). 275 
 Finally, there is the even greater ‘idle wheel’ problem: even if these abstract 276 
non-semantic lexical meanings could be elucidated, it is entirely unclear what role 277 
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they would play in the account of language meaning and use. On the relevance-278 
based pragmatic account of how ad hoc concepts/senses are contextually 279 
constructed in the process of utterance interpretation, the real work is done by the 280 
encyclopaedic information associated with a concept (a semantic entity) and there is 281 
no further constraining or guiding role to be played by a schematic meaning. Nor 282 
does the schema appear to play any role in a child’s acquisition of word meaning; in 283 
fact, the child’s first ‘meanings’ for a word are the (fully semantic) concepts/senses 284 
grasped in communication, so the abstract (non-semantic) meaning could only be 285 
acquired subsequently by some process of induction. Even supposing we could give 286 
an account of how this is done, what would be missing is an explanation for why it 287 
would be done, what purpose it would serve.  288 
 I have argued in more detail against these two ‘underspecification’ accounts of 289 
word meaning in Carston (forthcoming) and tried there to make a start on developing 290 
a quite different account. This requires making a distinction between the kind of 291 
lexicon that features in a narrowly construed I-language, with its focus on syntactic 292 
computations and constraints, and the lexicon of the broader public language 293 
system, which is a repository of communicative devices whose conceptual contents 294 
are what the inferential pragmatic system operates on. In the narrow I-lexicon, the 295 
words (or roots) listed have no meaning, conceptual or schematic, while in the C-296 
lexicon of the broader communicational language system, words are stored with their 297 
polysemy complexes (bundles of senses/concepts that have become conventionally 298 
associated with a word and perhaps others that are not yet fully established as stable 299 
senses). The account, as I conceive it, is fully compatible with the relevance-theoretic 300 
account of lexical adjustment/modulation in utterance understanding without requiring 301 
that a word has an encoded meaning which consists of a single concept/sense from 302 
which all context-specific uses are derived. Attempting to spell that story out here 303 
would take up too much space and is not necessary for the reflections on procedural 304 
meaning that take up the next section and are the main focus of this paper.    305 
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 In what follows, I will continue to talk of ‘conceptual meaning’ or ‘conceptual 306 
encoding’ in order to keep congruent with the way in which the conceptual/procedural 307 
meaning distinction is usually discussed. However, I hope it’s clear from the 308 
discussion just given that the position I am taking on substantive words is not that 309 
their lexical meaning is a full-fledged concept, but that they are typically used to 310 
express concepts (some of which become conventionally associated with them). 311 
 312 
 313 
3.   Procedural meaning (linguistic and nonlinguistic)  314 
 315 
3.1    The ever increasing domain of procedural meaning/encoding  316 
 317 
In her first major work on procedural meaning, ‘Semantic Constraints on Relevance’, 318 
Blakemore (1987) introduced the idea that there is a class of words, ‘discourse 319 
connectives’, whose function is not to contribute to the propositional content of an 320 
utterance but rather to constrain and guide the inferential phase of accessing the 321 
intended contextual assumptions and implications (that is, the implicatures of the 322 
utterance). These words do not encode concepts but provide a directive or instruction 323 
on how the propositional contents that they connect are to be deployed within the 324 
inferential process of deriving implicatures, e.g. as a premise in the cases of 325 
‘moreover’ and ‘after all’, as a conclusion in the case of ‘so’, as a means of blocking 326 
or eliminating some other assumption in the cases of ‘but’ and ‘however’. 327 
Blakemore’s focus then was on a fairly circumscribed small set of lexical items, which 328 
coincided quite closely with those cases of conventional (encoded) meaning which is 329 
non-truth-conditional, discussed by Grice under the label ‘conventional implicature’ 330 
(Grice 1989), although it was obviously framed in much more cognitive-scientific 331 
terms. Let’s call this Stage I in the history of procedural meaning. 332 
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 Blakemore’s idea caught on and was subsequently applied to a range of other 333 
linguistic elements whose meaning seems to be similarly non-truth-conditional and 334 
inference-guiding, for instance, various so-called discourse particles, which function 335 
as clues to the speaker’s propositional attitude or speech act rather than providing a 336 
component of propositional (truth-conditional) content, e.g. ‘please’, ‘huh’, and ‘alas’ 337 
in English, or the evidential particles ‘yo’ and ‘kana’ in Japanese which indicate a 338 
speaker’s degree of certainty about the proposition expressed. These elements are 339 
all in some sense appended to sentences, not integrated into phrasal structure, but 340 
occurring before or after the propositional vehicle. However, it was soon noted that 341 
other linguistic devices that are fully integrated into the sentential syntax might also 342 
be best thought of as encoding procedural meaning. For instance, Wilson & Sperber 343 
(1993) discuss the syntactic elements that encode declarative or imperative mood 344 
and interrogative word order as illocutionary force indicators that constrain the 345 
pragmatic inferential process of determining the speaker’s propositional attitude or 346 
speech act; e.g. the imperative might indicate the desirability (and potentiality) of the 347 
state of affairs described by the proposition expressed and this could be 348 
pragmatically interpreted as a case of requesting or ordering (hence as desirable to 349 
the speaker) or as a case of advising, warning, or permitting (hence as desirable to 350 
the hearer), depending on the context of use. 351 
 Other elements at the very heart of verb phrase grammar (e.g. inflections 352 
marking tense and aspect, modal verbs) have been analysed as cases of procedural 353 
encoding (see Escandell-Vidal et al. (2011a) for details and references). This marks 354 
another development too, which is that procedural meaning is no longer confined to 355 
attitudes toward, or inferences performed on, propositional contents, but is taken to 356 
play a role in the expression of the propositional content itself. A major move in this 357 
direction was made by Wilson & Sperber (1993) with their procedural account of the 358 
linguistic meaning of pronouns. As often noted, on any occasion of their 359 
communicative (deictic) use, the encoded meaning of pronouns like ‘I’ or ‘she’ 360 
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functions merely as a constraint or guide in ascertaining the intended referent and 361 
then drops out of the picture; it is the individual concept of the referent (e.g. the 362 
concept that uniquely picks out the person speaking in the case of ‘I’) which is the 363 
‘semantic value’ of the pronoun on that occasion and which enters into the 364 
proposition expressed. The idea has been naturally extended to other referential 365 
devices which work in a very similar way, e.g. demonstratives (Scott 2011, 2013). 366 
This period of extending the application of procedural (nonconceptual) encoding well 367 
beyond the initial domain of discourse connectives is Stage II in its history. 368 
 Although the reach of procedural meaning was considerably increased during 369 
this stage (from being only syntactically peripheral to also being syntactically integral, 370 
from being only non-truth-conditional to also being truth-conditional), there is a 371 
unifying characterisation of the role of all these kinds of procedural encoding: what 372 
they all do is constrain and guide pragmatic processes which are essential in deriving 373 
the intended interpretation (processes of reference assignment, identification of 374 
propositional  attitude and/or speech act, and implicature derivation). Given the 375 
widely accepted underdetermination of communicated content by linguistically 376 
encoded meaning and thus the necessity of pragmatic processes to bridge the gap, 377 
procedural meaning can be seen as a natural complement to encoded conceptual 378 
meaning in that what it does is ‘constrain the inferential phase of comprehension by 379 
reducing the hypothesis space that has to be searched in arriving at the intended 380 
interpretation’ (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 21). 381 
 Subsequently, however, procedural meaning has been extended considerably 382 
more and in two quite different ways.  First, it has been applied to a range of 383 
expressive devices, including interjections (e.g. ‘ouch’, ‘oops’), expletives (e.g. 384 
‘damn’, ‘that bastard Bloggs’), prosody (both linguistic and ‘natural’) and inherently 385 
communicative facial gestures (e.g. smiles, frowns) (Wharton 2003, 2009; Wilson & 386 
Wharton 2006; Blakemore 2011). Call that Stage III.  Second, it has been suggested 387 
that all concept-expressing words (e.g. ‘red’, ‘book’, ‘love’, ‘dance’) might also encode 388 
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a procedure that initiates a process of ad hoc concept construction (Wilson 2011). 389 
Call this Stage IV. These two developments are considered in sections 3.2 and 3.3 390 
respectively. I think they are so substantial as to require some major rethinking about 391 
what procedural meaning is and whether there is anything interesting in common 392 
between, say, the kind of meaning encoded by the pronoun ‘I’ and the kind of 393 
meaning encoded by the interjection ‘ugh’.   394 
 To end this section, I will mention some of the tests and probes for 395 
distinguishing between conceptual and procedural meaning that have been 396 
proposed, with a view to considering their adequacy, especially when applied to the 397 
expansions of the category of procedural meaning discussed in the next two 398 
sections. I simply list them here with a brief discussion of how each applies to the first 399 
two stages of the conceptual/procedural meaning distinction. Each heading gives a 400 
property that procedural meaning has been suggested to have (and which 401 
distinguishes it from conceptual meaning): 402 
 403 
1.  Introspective inaccessibility 404 
The basic idea here is that while we can consciously access the meaning of 405 
conceptual words like ‘chair’, ‘bachelor’, ‘teach’, ‘murder’, ‘intelligent’, ‘nasty’, and 406 
provide at least a rough paraphrase of them, it is much harder, perhaps impossible, 407 
to do this for  words with procedural meaning. In discussing discourse connectives 408 
like ‘however’, ‘furthermore’, ‘anyway’, and ‘well’, Wilson & Sperber (1993: 16) point 409 
out how difficult it is to describe their meaning and explain this in the following way: 410 
‘Conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness; procedures cannot. 411 
We have direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to the inferential 412 
computations used in comprehension.’ It has also been suggested that discourse 413 
connectives and particles are more difficult to translate into other languages than 414 
conceptual words and more difficult for L2 learners to grasp (the latter is certainly 415 
attested in the essay-writing of students whose non-native English is excellent except 416 
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for their use of such elements). These would be natural consequences of being 417 
‘relatively inaccessible to consciousness and resistant to conceptualisation’ (Wilson 418 
2011: 11-12).   419 
 However, this property of inaccessibility to our conscious descriptive 420 
capacities does not serve to separate out all the cases of putative procedural 421 
meaning discussed so far from cases of conceptual meaning. No-one finds much 422 
difficulty in mentally accessing and giving a description of what the pronouns ‘I’ and 423 
‘she’ mean – in fact, this seems a lot easier than paraphrasing the meaning of the 424 
quite common conceptual words ‘meaning’, ‘standard’, ‘mention’, ‘direct’ (to pick out 425 
a few from the book page currently in front of me). I’ll return to this property in the 426 
next section, on expressives, to which the rather similar property of ‘descriptive 427 
ineffability’ has been ascribed.      428 
 429 
2.  Non-compositionality 430 
Compositionality is usually taken as a fundamental property of language and thought, 431 
and in both cases the basic compositional unit is taken to be the lexical concept. It is 432 
quite hard to conceive of what compositionality of procedures could amount to, given 433 
their characterisation in Stages I and II above as instructions or constraints on 434 
inferential pragmatic processes. Occasionally two discourse connectives or particles 435 
may occur together in a single utterance, but when they do it seems that they each 436 
apply to a distinct component of the discourse and are applied in sequence rather 437 
than composing with each other. For instance, in the following, which is slightly odd 438 
but could perhaps arise, ‘Moreover, anyway, she has four children to look after’, the 439 
‘moreover’ procedure indicates that the sentence that follows provides another piece 440 
of evidence strengthening some salient conclusion (e.g. She’s unlikely to be able to 441 
come out for dinner), while the ‘anyway’ procedure indicates that some consideration 442 
previously raised (e.g. ‘We don’t have her phone number to call and invite her for 443 
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dinner’) is of low relevance compared with the following information (i.e. that she has 444 
four children to look after).   445 
 Discourse connectives and particles fall outside the proposition-conveying 446 
sentence; they are prosodically and semantically sealed off from it, like 447 
parentheticals, which might seem to be what accounts for their noncompositionality. 448 
However, the point is that they don’t compose phrasally in the way that concept-449 
expressing words situated parenthetically outside the proposition-conveying 450 
sentence do.  For instance, when used sententially, as a comment on a proposition, 451 
adverbials like ‘frankly’, ‘seriously’, ‘regrettably’, which are arguably conceptual, can 452 
be semantically composed into a more complex phrase: ‘To put it rather frankly but 453 
without malice, he is not up to the job’ (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 18). So there seems 454 
to be something right about this diagnostic for distinguishing procedural and 455 
conceptual meaning, and it carries over to the illocutionary devices claimed above to 456 
encode procedural meaning (e.g. ‘huh’, ‘alas’, indicative mood and interrogative word 457 
order). Again, though, it is less clear that it supports a procedural analysis of 458 
pronouns and demonstratives, which seem able to enter into phrasal compositions, 459 
e.g. ‘we lucky people’, ‘she alone of all my friends’, ‘you three lovely ladies who just 460 
came in’, etc. 461 
 462 
3.  Rigidity 463 
Escandell-Vidal & Leonetti (2011) provide another diagnostic for whether some 464 
component of meaning is conceptual or procedural, based on the ‘rigidity’ of 465 
procedural meaning as opposed to the flexibility of conceptual meaning. They show 466 
that when there is a mismatch between an element of procedural meaning, on the 467 
one hand, and a contextual assumption or an element of conceptual meaning, on the 468 
other hand, it is procedural meaning that always prevails, such that the context must 469 
accommodate (by adding an assumption) or the conceptual meaning is ‘coerced’ into 470 
compliance with the procedural meaning. For instance, they discuss a clash between 471 
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a conceptual predicate ‘to be silly’, which is stative, and the procedural instruction 472 
encoded by progressive aspect, ‘be + -ing’, which indicates that the event is to be 473 
viewed as an incomplete action in progress at the time of utterance, as in ‘John is 474 
being silly’. It is the former that gives way to the latter, so that the property or state of 475 
being silly is represented as an action in progress, hence a dynamic situation; there 476 
is no possibility of reinterpreting the procedural ‘be + -ing’ as stative. They provide a 477 
range of other examples which demonstrate the rigidity of the meaning of tense and 478 
grammatical aspect morphemes in the face of mismatches with conceptual meaning, 479 
which inevitably adjusts to conform to their procedural meaning. Somewhat similarly, 480 
discourse connectives force the retrieval of contextual assumptions that may be at 481 
odds with other strongly manifest assumptions, e.g. ‘Max was a millionaire but he 482 
had a lot of money’; in this case, we find no contrast between the two conjuncts as 483 
we assume that anyone who is a millionaire has a lot of money, but the presence of 484 
‘but’ forces us to search for a context in which these two facts could be at odds with 485 
each other, perhaps a context in which millionaires are deemed poor relative to some 486 
other group (trillionaires), and/or we might pragmatically adjust the conceptual 487 
content of ‘a lot of money’ so it does contrast with being a millionaire. 488 
 Again, it’s worth bearing in mind that all the cases of putative procedural 489 
meaning that Escandell-Vidal & Leonetti consider fall within stages I and II of the 490 
history of procedural meaning, so it remains to be seen how well this criterion stands 491 
up to the later extensions of the notion to expressives (e.g. interjections and 492 
expletives) and to typical conceptual words.  493 
 The next two proposed characteristics of procedural meaning are doubtless 494 
consequences of this general property of inflexibility, but I’ll separate them out here, 495 
so as to draw on them individually in the following subsections of the paper.   496 
 497 
4.  Non-susceptibility to nonliteral use  498 
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For my purpose here, I distinguish two broad families of nonliteral use, the one 499 
typified by metaphorical use (which is essentially a descriptive use of language, 500 
geared to conveying an observation about the world or our experience of it) and the 501 
other typified by irony (which is metapresentational, echoing a thought or utterance 502 
and expressing a dissociative attitude to it). It seems reasonably clear that discourse 503 
connectives, illocutionary force indicators (the syntactic moods, particles like ‘huh’, 504 
‘please’, and evidential markers like ‘yo’ and ‘kana’), tense and aspect morphemes, 505 
and determiners (‘a’, ‘the’) cannot be used metaphorically nor modulated more 506 
generally (narrowed or broadened) as concepts can be; they are not denotational 507 
and so don’t come with associated encyclopaedic information which plays the key 508 
role in metaphor understanding and meaning modulation quite generally. Similarly, 509 
although these procedure-encoding words might occur within a representation that is 510 
being treated ironically, they themselves are not the target of the ironical attitude, e.g. 511 
when mockingly echoing someone’s earlier utterance of ‘Moreover, the conditions 512 
are perfect for viewing the comet’ after it turns out to be a very cloudy night making it 513 
impossible to see anything in the sky, the irony is directed just at the sentential 514 
content of the utterance.   515 
 Again one might wonder about pronouns, whether they are all incapable of 516 
being used metaphorically; consider, for instance, the use of ‘she’ to refer to one’s 517 
car, or ‘we’ to refer to oneself and one’s laptop (e.g. patting the laptop and saying 518 
‘We are not doing any more work today’) might be some kind of metaphorical 519 
extension. Equally, ironical uses of pronouns may be possible, although they are 520 
perhaps better thought of as components of the closely related phenomenon of 521 
parody, e.g. ‘We are proud of our achievements; we have made Britain strong; we 522 
…’, echoing Mrs Thatcher’s use of the royal ‘we’, or ‘She still sounds like a man to 523 
me’, said of a transgender woman and dissociatively echoing others’ use of the 524 
pronoun ‘she’. Whether expressives can be used metaphorically or ironically is 525 
discussed in the next section.    526 
20 
 
   527 
5.   Not polysemous 528 
The phenomenon of polysemy is ubiquitous for concept-expressing words (nouns, 529 
verbs, adjectives); they are all, potentially at least, associated with families of related 530 
concepts. As discussed in section 2, polysemy is the conventionalisation of 531 
senses/concepts that were originally derived by online pragmatic processes of 532 
concept adjustment (meaning modulation). It is quite hard to conceive of procedural 533 
meaning as being modulated in any comparable sense; that is, used to convey a 534 
procedure, a constraint on pragmatic processing, which is more specific or more 535 
general than the one it encodes. It should follow, then, that words that encode 536 
procedural meaning are not polysemous (or ‘polyprocedural’), that is, are not 537 
associated with a family of related uses. Whether this is, in fact, the case is 538 
somewhat hard to assess: the word ‘but’ and its counterpart in other languages has 539 
often been claimed to have two or more related uses (Blakemore 1989, 2002); the 540 
array of (related) speech acts associated with the imperative mood (order, request, 541 
advice, permission) could be thought of as a case of polysemy, and so also for the 542 
other mood indicators. Whatever is the right way to think about these multiple related 543 
uses and how they arise, it seems safe to say that the words being discussed here 544 
as procedural are much less susceptible to developing new uses than the standard 545 
concept-expressing words.  546 
 547 
I draw two conclusions from this brief survey of diagnostics for procedural meaning. 548 
First, it looks unlikely that there is any watertight test for telling whether some 549 
element of encoded meaning is conceptual or procedural. The most we can hope for 550 
is trending evidence: if it can’t be pragmatically adjusted in online comprehension, 551 
there’s a high likelihood that it is procedural; if when in conflict with some clearly 552 
conceptual component it forces an adjustment to that component, it’s probably 553 
procedural; if it’s difficult to translate and otherwise competent non-native speakers 554 
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tend to get it wrong, then it may well be procedural, and so on. Second, it is striking 555 
how variable the profiles of the various expressions proposed during Stage II of the 556 
history of procedural meaning are with regard to this list of properties or diagnostics; 557 
pronouns, in particular, seem to be out on their own. This heterogeneity of (alleged) 558 
cases of procedural meaning becomes all the more evident in the following sections.  559 
 560 
3.2 Expressives and procedural meaning/encoding 561 
 562 
The topic of expressives and the distinction between expressive meaning and 563 
descriptive meaning was brought to prominence by Kaplan’s important formal 564 
semantic work on expressions such as ‘ouch’, ‘oops’ and ‘That bastard Bloggs’ 565 
(Kaplan 1997). I will sidestep a lot of interesting issues here in order to focus as 566 
squarely as possible on the work within relevance theory that maintains that a 567 
substantial subset of expressives encode procedural meaning. These include 568 
interjections and certain facial signals (Wharton 2003, 2009), tones of voice and 569 
other kinds of emotional prosody (Wharton & Wilson 2006), expletives, diminutives 570 
and NP epithets like ‘the bastard’, ‘the poppet’ (Blakemore 2011, 2015).2 One of the 571 
issues I will set aside is the extent to which the cases included here count as properly 572 
linguistic or not: some clearly do (e.g. the various NPs cited above), others clearly do 573 
not (e.g. facial signals and other expressive vocal and bodily signals), and the status 574 
of others is somewhat unclear (e.g. interjections; see Wharton (2003)). 575 
 For a serviceable working conception of ‘expressive’ meaning, we can follow 576 
Potts (2007) in characterising it as a dimension of meaning that is distinct from the 577 
dimension of descriptive truth-conditional meaning in that it does not impact on the 578 
truth/falsity of an utterance and is not put forth for the endorsement or denial of an 579 
                                                          
2  As Blakemore points out, there are a range of other communicative devices that seem to fall under 
the label ‘expressive’ which do not involve procedural meaning. In this regard, she discusses the 
expressive effects of certain kinds of repetition (e.g. ‘My childhood days are gone, gone’) (Blakemore 
2011) and the special properties of the socio-politically charged case of slurs (Blakemore 2015). 
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interlocutor. It has some quite other kind of purpose and impact, which can be 580 
roughly thought of as the expression or communication of an emotive attitude to 581 
some component of the context (a person, object, action or situation). This is rough, 582 
but will do for the current purpose of looking at the attribution of procedural meaning 583 
to these sorts of expressions. 584 
 In her discussion of linguistic expressives (expletives and NP epithets), 585 
Blakemore (2011) suggests that: ‘Like discourse markers, these expressions 586 
correspond to procedures for interpretation. However, in contrast with discourse 587 
markers, they activate procedures for retrieving representations of emotional states.’ 588 
So this is a different role for procedural meaning from that of the Stage II 589 
characterisation of it as ‘facilitating the identification of the speaker’s meaning by 590 
narrowing the search space for pragmatic inferential comprehension’, where this was 591 
a matter of recovering the intended propositional content (explicatures and 592 
implicatures). Rather, what is going on here is the activation or triggering of 593 
something non-propositional, something with a distinctively emotive evaluative 594 
content.   595 
 The big move for the notion of procedural meaning/encoding is its application 596 
beyond the clearly linguistic to other kinds of codes, natural and conventional, as 597 
developed by Tim Wharton. For the case of interjections (e.g. ‘ugh’, ‘wow’, ‘oops’, 598 
‘aha’), Wharton (2003) argues against accounts that have offered rich conceptual 599 
analyses (e.g. Wierzbicka 1992) and in favour of encoded procedures which ‘… 600 
activate various attitudinal concepts or types of concepts. Under such an account 601 
wow would not encode a concept that a hearer translates as ‘X is delighted’. Instead, 602 
wow activates a range of attitudinal descriptions which involve delight, surprise, 603 
excitement etc. In the case of yuk, the attitude will be one of disgust; in the case of 604 
aha it will be an attitude of surprise, etc.’ (ibid: 60). Of course, the attitudinal and 605 
emotional descriptions triggered by the interjection will be modulated by other 606 
components of the ostensive stimulus, including decoded concepts (e.g. ‘Wow, I’m 607 
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crazy about your new dress’), other expressive devices (emotional prosody, facial 608 
expressions), and the wider context. In Wharton’s view, most interjections are best 609 
viewed as originating from something akin to Goffman’s (1981) ‘response cries’, that 610 
is, spontaneous natural expressions of feeling, that have become coded devices 611 
available for ostensive communication.  612 
 As he notes, this marks a departure from the way in which procedural 613 
meaning/ encoding had often been characterised up to that point, especially with 614 
regard to the Stage I discussion of discourse connectives as ‘computational 615 
instructions to the hearer’. He suggests a broader construal of procedural meaning 616 
‘as simply activating certain types of representations, or contextual assumptions, or 617 
expectations about cognitive effects. Thus, a pronoun might activate a certain class 618 
of candidate referents from which the hearer must choose ...  mood indicators [can 619 
be seen] as activating certain propositional-attitude descriptions’ (ibid: 59). And the 620 
procedural meaning of discourse connectives can be viewed along the same lines: 621 
‘For what discourse connectives, mood indicators and pronouns have in common is 622 
that rather than translating into the constituents of conceptual representations they 623 
activate something. What is actually activated may be computational deductive rules, 624 
or contextual assumptions, or simply expectations about cognitive effects.’ (ibid: 60). 625 
This broader construal of procedural meaning as activating or triggering kinds of 626 
representations or computations provides a unitary characterisation of all the cases 627 
discussed so far (discourse connectives and particles, illocutionary indicating 628 
devices, pronouns and interjections), but at the cost of losing the sharp distinction 629 
between conceptual and procedural encoding in Blakemore’s original work. 630 
 There is a final step in this incorporation of a range of expressives into the 631 
class of procedural encoding and that is the inclusion of certain natural facial 632 
gestures like smiling, frowning, shrugging, and (perhaps) nose-wrinkling and lip-633 
curling, and certain natural prosodic gestures like affective tones of voice. These are 634 
components of what Wharton calls natural codes, that is, they are ‘signals’, natural 635 
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behaviours which have evolved for the purpose of conveying information to others.3 636 
These too fall under the characterisation of procedural encoding as activating or 637 
triggering mental states of one sort or another; in these cases, it seems that, as with 638 
interjections, what is activated is a representation of something non-propositional (not 639 
evaluable as true or false), an attitudinal or emotional state. Wilson & Wharton (2006) 640 
further elaborate on this way of thinking about communicative devices that encode 641 
procedural meaning: ‘such expressions might be described as encoding meta-642 
procedures, which manage the accessibility or activation levels of the regular 643 
relevance-oriented procedures for perception, memory retrieval or inference …’ (ibid: 644 
1570-71). 645 
 The question that needs to be revisited at this stage concerns the distinction 646 
between procedural encoding and conceptual encoding. It might seem that this 647 
broader construal of procedural meaning is so inclusive that it draws in concept-648 
expressing words, in that they too can be thought of as encoding (meta)procedures, 649 
procedures which activate a cluster of related concepts (with their encyclopaedic 650 
entries), thereby giving the pragmatic system a strong steer towards the speaker’s 651 
intended meaning. However, this is not the intended idea and a distinction is 652 
retained. Wharton (2009) maintains that a word with conceptual meaning activates a 653 
concept via translational encoding while procedural meaning activates concepts via 654 
non-translational encoding (ibid: 60). Wilson (2011) makes the distinction in a 655 
somewhat similar way, saying that conceptual expressions (e.g. ‘dog’, ‘jump’, 656 
‘happy’) ‘are systematically linked to concepts, which are constituents of a language 657 
of thought’ while procedural expressions ‘are systematically linked to states of 658 
language users’ (ibid: 10). Both are assuming that concept-expressing words like 659 
‘dog’, ‘jump’, and ‘happy’ encode a single concept (a constituent of the language of 660 
                                                          
3  Wharton (2003, 2009) makes an important distinction between these natural coded ‘signals’, which 
have evolved for the purpose of conveying information, and natural signs from which information may 




thought) as their standing lexical meaning. As noted at the end of section 2, I’ve tried 661 
to argue for a different position on concept-expressing words (Carston 2013, 662 
forthcoming), a view whose implications for the conceptual/procedural distinction I’ll 663 
briefly consider in the conclusion (section 4).  664 
 The heterogeneity of communicative devices (linguistic and nonlinguistic) 665 
claimed to encode procedural meaning is greatly increased by the inclusion of the 666 
expressive items discussed in this section: it now runs from ‘but’ and ‘she’ through to 667 
‘yuk’, a smile and an angry tone of voice.  668 
 Let’s briefly run through some of the diagnostics for distinguishing procedural 669 
meaning from conceptual meaning given in the previous section, to see how the 670 
expressives fare and whether they line up in this respect with any of the procedural 671 
expressions previously discussed. Potts (2007) and Blakemore (2011) have ascribed 672 
the property of descriptive ineffability to expressives: speakers are unable to 673 
satisfactorily paraphrase expressive content using descriptive (conceptual) terms. 674 
This property is somewhat similar to, but weaker than, the property of introspective 675 
inaccessibility discussed in the previous section, so any element that has this latter 676 
property (e.g. discourse connectives and particles) will have the former property; 677 
pronouns seem to have neither, as it is pretty easy to describe their meaning in 678 
conceptual terms. Most theorists seem to agree that expressives like ‘blimmin heck’, 679 
‘crikey’, ‘that bastard X’ are descriptively ineffable (see Potts 2007, Geurts 2007, 680 
Blakemore 2011, Drożdżowicz forthcoming) and Wharton’s (2003) critique of 681 
attempts to provide adequate conceptual meanings for interjections would indicate 682 
that they too have this property. As for affective facial expressions and tones of 683 
voice, Wilson & Wharton (2006) point out that they tend to create ‘diffuse impressions 684 
… involving marginal alterations in the strength or salience of a wide array of 685 
conclusions rather than providing strong support for a single, determinate conclusion’ 686 
(ibid: 1566), indicating that they too are unlikely to be satisfactorily captured in 687 
descriptive (conceptual) terms. The problem with this diagnostic, though, as with 688 
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‘introspective inaccessibility’, is that it applies to plenty of concept-expressing words 689 
too; as Geurts (2007: 210) puts it: ‘…‘‘descriptive ineffability’’ is not the prerogative of 690 
expressives. As a matter of fact, it is all over the lexicon, as witness such disparate 691 
items as the, at, because, languid, green, pretty, and so forth.’4 692 
 Consider next the property of non-compositionality with regard to the 693 
expressives under discussion. It seems to me to do pretty well – not only is 694 
expressive content largely independent of descriptive content so unable to compose 695 
with it (see Potts 2007), but expressive items do not compose with each other in 696 
anything like the phrasal manner of descriptive/conceptual content.  They are, of 697 
course, highly interactive: the expressive content of an utterance of ‘wow’ or ‘you 698 
bastard’ will be modulated by an accompanying facial expression (a smile, an 699 
eyebrow raise) and/or an affective tone of voice (affectionate, dismissive), but this is 700 
more a matter of blending into a single emotive attitude than of composing meaning 701 
constituents into more complex structures.    702 
 Whether expressives evince the kind of rigidity, overruling 703 
descriptive/conceptual content, that Escandell-Vidal & Leonetti (2011) attribute to 704 
procedural meaning (as discussed in the previous section) is an interesting question. 705 
It does seem that tones of voice and natural signals like smiles and frowns hold sway 706 
when they are at odds with the conceptual content of an utterance, e.g. ‘I’m not angry 707 
– don’t imagine you have that sort of power over me’ delivered in a tone of voice that 708 
indicates fury bordering on hysteria, or ‘Yuck, that smells delicious’ where the 709 
interjection seems to force an ironical or otherwise dissociative interpretation of the 710 
conceptual content of ‘delicious’. As for the possibility of using expressives non-711 
literally, at least some seem amenable to metaphorical use, e.g. ‘Ouch’ as a 712 
response to some minor bad news (e.g. a parking fine), involving a transfer from the 713 
                                                          
4  See Drożdżowicz (forthcoming) for a nuanced discussion of the notion of descriptive ineffability, in 
which she argues against its utility as a criterion for distinguishing different types of meaning, such as 




domain of physical discomfort to psychological annoyance; ‘That bastard computer 714 
has crashed again’, involving a personifying use of the epithet ‘bastard’. However, it 715 
is difficult to imagine a metaphorical use of most expletives (‘Damn!’, ‘Bugger!’) or of 716 
facial expressions (smiles, frowns), or tones of voice.  717 
 Ironical, echoic and other non-serious uses are certainly possible for many 718 
interjections, and for NP epithets, e.g. ironical uses of ‘wow’, ‘oops’, ‘yuck’, are easy 719 
to concoct (an exercise for the reader) and ‘I see that bastard Boris has rescued you 720 
again’ could be understood as irony directed at the addressee’s earlier use of the 721 
epithet ‘bastard’ with regard to Boris or perhaps at her generally negative 722 
complaining attitude toward Boris. With regard to the diagnostic of non-polysemy, 723 
Geurts (2007) maintains that at least some expressive terms have multiple related 724 
contents/use, discussing in particular the NP epithet ‘bastard’. By and large, though, 725 
the kind of wide-spread ever-evolving polysemy that is typical of concept-expressing 726 
words does not seem to be in evidence across the broad class of expressives.  727 
 Again we have a very mixed profile of properties for the various 728 
communicative devices now included under the ‘procedural encoding’ umbrella and it 729 
is worth considering whether this now much broader, more abstract construal of 730 
procedural meaning is providing any interesting insight into the many different kinds 731 
of cases it subsumes, beyond merely indicating that they are all different, in one way 732 
or another, from conceptual encoding. In the next section, we move to Stage IV in the 733 
history of procedural meaning, the final stage, where it is proposed that all concept-734 
encoding words also encode procedural meaning.  735 
 736 
3.3 Concept-expressing words and procedural meaning 737 
 738 
In a major assessment of the conceptual-procedural distinction (‘past, present and 739 
future’), Deirdre Wilson (2011) has given increased significance to the role of 740 
procedural meaning in lexical semantics and has, in effect, suggested that all words 741 
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encode a procedural component of meaning while some (the open classes) also 742 
encode a concept. She attributes to Dan Sperber the idea that all words with a 743 
conceptual meaning may also encode ‘an instruction to inferentially construct an ad 744 
hoc concept using the encoded conceptual content as a starting point’. She endorses 745 
this suggestion and elaborates it as follows: 746 
 747 
‘On this approach, most words would encode some procedural content. Some would 748 
also encode conceptual content, whereas others (e.g. however) would not. Among 749 
words with both procedural and conceptual content, some (e.g. giraffe) would 750 
automatically trigger a procedure for constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis of 751 
the encoded concept, whereas others (e.g. unless) might encode a more specific 752 
procedure of the type familiar from Blakemore’s work.’ (ibid: 17) 753 
 754 
 She goes on to mention some advantages of this account over the standard 755 
RT position according to which most substantive words encode just a concept. One 756 
is that it would make sense of the recurrent claim, arising from work in lexical 757 
pragmatics, that words function as ‘pointers to’ or ‘pieces of evidence about’ the 758 
speaker’s meaning. Another is that it would dissolve a certain tension in the RT 759 
account of metaphorical and other nonliteral uses of words. The account has always 760 
rejected the Gricean treatment of nonliteral uses in terms of a flouting of a maxim of 761 
truthfulness and has maintained that it is not the case that the literal meaning (the 762 
encoded concept) is always the first to be considered as the correct interpretation 763 
and is only discarded in favour of another interpretation if it doesn’t meet certain 764 
pragmatic standards (of informativeness, relevance, etc). However, the worry is that, 765 
given that the relevance-based comprehension heuristic explicitly licenses hearers to 766 
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follow a path of least effort in accessing and testing interpretations for relevance,5 it 767 
seems natural to suppose that the encoded concept, which is made instantly 768 
available by the word form, would be tried first and only pragmatically adjusted if it 769 
didn’t meet the required standards of relevance. The suggested move to incorporate 770 
into the meaning of content words a procedural component which requires that a 771 
relevance-driven process of concept construction is undertaken ensures that, 772 
although the encoded concept is activated by the word uttered, it is not necessarily 773 
the first one to be composed into the interpretation. Rather, the concept expressed 774 
by a loose or metaphorical use of a word can be the first one that a hearer following 775 
this procedure recovers and tests for relevance. 776 
 This new conception of the meaning of open-class words as both conceptual 777 
and procedural raises a number of questions. First, it is difficult to see why a word 778 
that encodes a concept (a semantic entity with a ‘linguistically specified denotation’) 779 
would also encode a procedure that makes it obligatory for a hearer to build an ad 780 
hoc concept from the encoded one, especially when the encoded concept can, on 781 
occasion, be the concept communicated (Sperber & Wilson 1998). Second, the 782 
procedure involved would be identical across all words which are taken to encode a 783 
concept, that is, the words ‘giraffe’, ‘milk’, ‘run’, ‘speak’, ‘raw’, ‘red’, and every other 784 
open-class word would come with the same component of procedural meaning, 785 
namely, ‘Construct an ad hoc concept based on the encoded concept’, which seems 786 
odd since, by and large, the lexical meanings of words are distinct from each other 787 
and this goes as much for procedural meaning as for conceptual meaning, e.g. the 788 
procedural meaning of the pronouns ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘we’, ‘they’ is plainly distinct for each 789 
one, and linguists working on the procedural meaning of such closely related 790 
discourse connectives as ‘but’, ‘however’, ‘nevertheless’ and ‘although’ have put a lot 791 
                                                          
5  In brief, the relevance-based comprehension heuristic says: (a) Follow a path of least effort in 
constructing an interpretation of the utterance; (b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are 
satisfied. For more detail, see Wilson & Sperber 2004, 2012. 
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of effort into pinpointing the fine differences in the inferential procedures they encode 792 
or activate (see Blakemore 2000, 2002).  793 
 More important, it is entirely unnecessary on the relevance-theoretic account 794 
of utterance interpretation to issue instructions to the pragmatic system to construct 795 
ad hoc concepts. The goal of utterance interpretation is to recover a speaker’s 796 
meaning, that is, the thought or thoughts she intends to communicate, where 797 
thoughts are structured arrays of concepts. On the account suggested, the words at 798 
issue encode concepts, so it is already evident that these words are contributors of 799 
concepts to the interpretation. The general relevance-based comprehension heuristic 800 
takes care of the rest, that is, it ensures that the concepts recovered as speaker-801 
meant are those that contribute to an optimally relevant interpretation, which may 802 
entail that the concept encoded is pragmatically adjusted (narrowed, broadened, or 803 
both), as discussed in section 2.1. So, the idea that, in addition to all this, every 804 
open-class word comes with (or triggers) an instruction to build an ad hoc concept 805 
seems otiose.6 806 
 Furthermore, there is a way of capturing the desirable aspects of the proposal 807 
while avoiding these problems and that is to construe the meaning of concept-808 
expressing words along the lines I discussed in section 2, that is, as not encoding a 809 
particular concept (a potential component of a thought or truth-conditional content), 810 
but something more minimal, something essentially non-semantic (‘wrong format’ in 811 
Recanati’s (2004) terms), which merely makes the occasion-specific communicated 812 
concept accessible to the addressee.  In Carston (2013) I discussed the hypothesis 813 
that so-called ‘content’ words have a semantically underspecified schematic lexical 814 
meaning, that is, they encode a concept schema or blueprint which constrains the 815 
concept they can be used to communicate. However, as discussed in section 2.2 816 
above, there is a range of problems with this idea: it seems nigh impossible to spell 817 
                                                          
6  See Curco (2011) for independent arguments against treating ad hoc concept construction as a 
matter of procedural encoding.  
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out what these ‘thin meanings’ amount to; given the pragmatic processes that 818 
underpin the formation of families of senses, schematic meanings don’t seem to play 819 
any role in comprehension; they are forced to become more and more attenuated in 820 
response to new uses/senses of the word. So it may be that we need to move to an 821 
apparently even more extreme position according to which lexical ‘meaning’ consists 822 
in nothing more than a pointer, a connection or gateway to a space of conceptual 823 
information from which the addressee is to access or construct the relevant 824 
(intended) concept. As the work in lexical pragmatics indicates, all we want from the 825 
stable substantive lexicon is a means of interfacing with the conceptual system so as 826 
to access thoughts that bear an appropriately close relationship with those the 827 
speaker has in mind. On such an account, each word comes with its own distinct 828 
pointer or interfacing component, which constrains the general pragmatic process of 829 
accessing or constructing a concept, a process which is wholly motivated by the goal 830 
of the pragmatic system which is to deliver speaker meaning. As the lexical ‘meaning’ 831 
is not conceptual (not semantic), but is merely a means of locating an area of 832 
conceptual space (which may include a cluster of concepts comprising the polysemy 833 
complex associated with a word), concept construction is an obligatory pragmatic 834 
process. 835 
 This sort of account, assuming it can be properly worked out, is not prey to the 836 
problems I mentioned above for the concept-plus-procedure account: it does not 837 
entail an obligatory process that is, paradoxically, sometimes unnecessary (when the 838 
encoded concept is the concept communicated), it doesn’t entail a component of 839 
lexical meaning that is the same for thousands of words (that is, the instruction to 840 
build an ad hoc concept) and it doesn’t formulate within the lexical semantics of a 841 
language a process (concept construction) that is entirely a matter of pragmatics. 842 
Furthermore, the advantages that Wilson discusses for the concept-plus-procedure 843 
account, are equally carried by this alternative ‘gateway’ account: it makes perfect 844 
sense of the idea that all words are merely pointers to, or evidence for, a speaker’s 845 
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meaning, and, since there is no encoded concept, it allows for any one of a range of 846 
concepts to be the first one accessed or constructed, as determined by 847 
considerations of relevance. 848 
 849 
 850 
4.   Final remarks: Is all encoded meaning procedural (in a sense)? 851 
 852 
In discussing the processes involved in utterance interpretation, relevance theorists 853 
have long made one major distinction, that between linguistic decoding and 854 
pragmatic inference, both of which are inevitably involved in linguistic communication 855 
(that is, comprehending an utterance is never simply a matter of linguistic decoding). 856 
The conceptual/procedural distinction has been conceived as two kinds of linguistic 857 
meaning, two different sorts of information that can be linguistically encoded, but 858 
perhaps all linguistic encoding is fundamentally procedural in a certain sense, a 859 
much broader sense than that originally envisaged. Building on the discussions in 860 
Wharton (2009), Blakemore (2011) and Wilson (2011), we might wonder whether 861 
what happens when, as addressees, we ‘decode’ any component of an ostensive 862 
stimulus (whether linguistic or non-linguistic) is the triggering or activating of certain 863 
information structures (for want of a better term) in our minds: these may be 864 
conceptual, inferential (‘procedural’, in the original Stage I sense), attitudinal or 865 
affective (perhaps even sensori-perceptual). In the case of interjections, expletives 866 
and expressive prosody, what is activated is information about attitudinal and 867 
emotional states, while what is activated in the case of discourse connectives is 868 
information about how to inferentially relate propositional representations formed in 869 
understanding the utterance. As for the case of substantive words (typical nouns, 870 
verbs, and adjectives), which have been standardly assumed in RT to encode a 871 
single lexical concept, perhaps they too are procedural in this broadened sense. It’s 872 
not that they encode an instruction to construct or access an ad hoc concept, but that 873 
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they activate or trigger a polysemy complex, a bundle of related concepts (perhaps 874 
not all conventionalised to the same degree), with their accompanying encyclopaedic 875 
information. From there on the standard RT pragmatic account kicks in, ‘homing in’ 876 
on the specific concept intended, possibly involving an adjustment/modulation of one 877 
of the activated concepts in the polysemy cluster.  878 
 This would really amount to a reconstrual of what ‘decoding’ is, one that 879 
applies to all basic units of communicative codes (linguistic and nonlinguistic). When, 880 
as addressees, we identify a word or some other conventional unit of communication, 881 
some information structure (conceptual, computational or affective/attitudinal) is 882 
triggered or activated in our minds as part of that identification process. Within this 883 
very broad unifying construal of procedural meaning as having a triggering/activating 884 
role, there would obviously be important distinctions to be made and subcategories to 885 
be investigated, so the focus would shift from trying to understand the 886 
conceptual/procedural distinction to trying to understand different categories of 887 
procedural meaning.  888 
 889 
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